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Abstract
This paper provides a model of strategic exploration in which two competing play-
ers simultaneously explore a set of alternatives over time to study search dynamics,
payoff divisions, and distributions of discovery time. The strategic tension is between
preemption, i.e., the incentive to covertly explore alternatives that the opponent will
explore in future, and prioritization, i.e., the incentive to explore alternatives with the
highest success probabilities. We show that players randomize over the same set of al-
ternatives that expands over time, duplicating each other’s explorations from start to
finish. When players are symmetric in their speed of exploration, equilibrium strategies
are greedy. In the asymmetric case, the weak player’s strategy is greedy, but the strong
player randomizes over alternatives with different posteriors and captures a share of
payoff disproportionately larger than his share of exploration capacity. The weak player
conducts extensive instead of intensive exploration, i.e., he covers as many alternatives
as the strong player does but never explores any alternative with cumulative probabil-
ity one. The overall discovery time decreases in asymmetry in the first-order stochastic
dominance sense.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents and analyzes a model of strategic exploration in which players compete
over time to explore a set of alternatives in order to find good candidates. The benchmark
model is in its simplest form. The set of alternatives is the unit interval, and at most
one alternative is good. Two players sharing a common prior explore the set of alternatives
independently and simultaneously in continuous time, without directly observing each other’s
exploration activities. They each face a capacity constraint on the measure of the alternatives
explored per unit of time. Whoever finds the good alternative first will claim its return
exclusively; they split the return equally in the case of simultaneous discovery.1
The model captures a strategic tension between preemption and prioritization. Players
are incentivized by competition to preempt their opponents’ future explorations, but the
presence of multiple available alternatives with different success probabilities incentivizes
these competing players to prioritize over the more promising ones. The trade-off remains
the driving force of equilibrium behavior in more complex settings where the tools and
concepts developed for the benchmark model are still applicable, such as asymmetric capacity
constraints, general spaces of alternatives, multiple (or a continuum of) good alternatives,
more than two players, and general time preferences. We will also consider gradual learning
where the outcome of each alternative arrives at a Poisson rate controlled by resources
allocated to the alternative. We show that the distributional strategy in the benchmark
model of instantaneous learning materializes as a pure strategy in effort allocations over
alternatives. The model thus captures a tractable strategic bandit problem with a continuum
of arms; in contrast, conventional strategic bandit models with more than two arms are often
intractable.
The strategic tension between preemption and prioritization arises in many dynamic
economic search problems. These alternatives can be scientific experiments, research ideas,
product designs, job opportunities, dating partners, etc. The primary objective of this paper
is to understand the equilibrium and payoff implications of this strategic tension in a simple
and flexible model and to develop suitable analytical tools.
Preemption motives under capacity constraint necessitate randomization. In the model
of continuous time and a continuous space of alternatives, the conventional approach of
defining both pure and mixed strategies based on intuitions from discrete models is no longer
useful (and a fully discrete model is not tractable either), as it does not take advantage of the
1The analysis and the results remain the same if, instead, the first finder enjoys a larger return, and they
split the return in an arbitrary way in the case of simultaneous discovery.
1
continua to simplify the analysis. We redefine the pure strategy on the outcome space, which
stipulates whether or not an alternative will be tried by each moment in time. We then define
a notion of distributional strategies, and show that it is an appropriate representation of a
mixture over pure strategies. The simple language of distributional strategies in continuous
time and a continuous action space is convenient for describing the evolution of posterior
beliefs and facilitating equilibrium analysis that is intractable in discrete problems.
The model has a unique Nash equilibrium in distributional strategies. Both players ran-
domize over unexplored alternatives with the same highest posteriors from an expanding
set, in a way so that the posteriors are “leveled off” gradually over time. The equilibrium
strategy is “greedy” in that it searches only alternatives with the highest posterior. Myopic
optimization happens to be a best response, but the equilibrium is not a result of myopic
optimization. Players must consider not only the myopic value of each alternative (measured
by its posterior density) but also the option value (which is determined by how intensively
his opponent will explore certain alternatives in the future). Indeed, the expanding set of
alternatives and its expansion over time are determined by the dynamic equilibration of
preemption and prioritization. The necessity of randomization drives a wedge between equi-
librium exploration and optimal exploration that minimizes the time of discovery. Without
concerns of preemption, the latter would be achieved by a coordinated exploration that
prioritizes alternatives according to their prior probabilities. The unique equilibrium in dis-
tributional strategies, determined fully by the level of the highest posterior beliefs over time,
remains the same when the space of alternatives is multidimensional, or when there are
multiple good alternatives that are independent and identically distributed, even though the
implementation of mixed strategies necessarily depends on the space of alternatives.
The unique Nash equilibrium is symmetric if players have symmetric exploration capac-
ity, i.e., the measure of alternatives a player explores per unit of time. With asymmetric
capacities, the Nash equilibrium in distributional strategies is again unique. But the equi-
librium posteriors facing the two players can no longer be the same due to their different
speeds of exploration. The strategy of the strong player (she) is not greedy because she
randomizes over alternatives with different posteriors. Her strategy levels off the posterior
for the weak player (he) who plays a greedy strategy, i.e., he randomizes over alternatives
with the highest posterior. The weak player covers all alternatives, but never explores any
single one with cumulative probability one, even though he has the capacity to do so for a
subset of them. In other words, the weak player conducts extensive exploration instead of
intensive exploration. In contrast, the strong player always explores all alternatives with
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probability one. The unique equilibrium has an interesting payoff implication. We give a
simple formula for the equilibrium payoffs, showing that the strong player enjoys a larger
share in payoff than in exploration capacity. If the exploration capacity of the weak player is
fraction α < 1 of that of his opponent, the strong player enjoys fraction (1− α) + 12α of the
surplus in equilibrium. It is as if the strong player exclusively enjoys fraction 1− α, before
the two split the remainder equally. If we fix the total capacity and vary its division between
the players, the overall discovery time decreases in asymmetry in the first-order stochastic
dominance sense, but the preemption incentive plays a non-vanishing role in slowing down
discovery even when the weak player’s capacity is vanishingly small. As in the symmetric
case, players spend a lot of time on alternatives with low prior probabilities of successes
before they turn to the more promising ones, and duplicate each other’s exploration from
start to finish.
Related literature
The paper relates to several branches of active research. Optimal exploration of an unknown
area is a classic problem in operations research and computer science because of its appli-
cations in navigation algorithms and robotics, where inefficiency typically arises from the
path dependence of exploration of physical locations.2 This literature has so far neglected
game-theoretic aspects of explorations, although many applications involve interactions of
multiple agents. We do not consider the path-dependence in exploring physical locations.
Instead, the alternatives can be research ideas, scientific experiments, job opportunities, etc.,
all of which are of interest in economics.
Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997) study a discrete-time finite-alternative search problem
with preemption. As their analysis demonstrates, the discrete problem is intractable once
we go beyond the case of a uniform prior. Under a uniform prior, however, there does
not exist a trade-off between prioritization and preemption, which is the central strategic
issue we study in this paper.3 Matros, Ponomareva, Smirnov, and Wait (2019) consider a
discrete-time continuum-alternative search model, but it is qualitatively different because
the preemption incentive is assumed away so that an equilibrium can be found in pure
strategies; furthermore, simultaneous discoveries are assumed to destroy the prize, so the rent
2See, for example, the surveys by Kleinberg (1994) and Megow, Mehlhorn, and Schweitzer (2012).
3Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997) allow players to choose their search capacities. They discuss the
case where exactly one alternative has a different probability of success from the rest. Establishing an
equilibrium is intractable even in this case, but they make the observation that, under some parameter
values, this alternative cannot be searched first with probability 1.
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is dissipated completely in the pure-strategy equilibrium by a Bertrand-style competition.4
Chatterjee and Evans (2004) embed a two-alternative model of treasure hunting in a dy-
namic R&D game with Poisson bandits. Klein and Rady (2011) analyze a continuous-time
model of a negative correlated bandit, in which one of the two arms contains a prize and
two players share a common value instead of competing with each other. Again there is no
preemption–prioritization trade-off. The canonical models of strategic experimentation by
Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005) and Bolton and Harris (1999), which capture a trade-off
of exploration and exploitation, are very useful for studying dynamic search, learning, and
innovation. These models are also used to investigate incentive designs and information rev-
elation for experimentation in various economic applications.5 Most models in this literature
are variants of a one-armed bandit, with one risky alternative and a safe default option, which
preclude the rich set of experiments available in many search and innovation processes. In
addition, the issue of dynamic prioritization is assumed away in a model with only one risky
arm. Multiple-armed strategic bandit problems, even when the arms are independent, are
largely intractable. This paper focuses on exploration with the trade-off of preemption and
prioritization. With an appropriate formulation of strategies, a continuous-time continuum-
armed strategic bandit introduced in this paper overcomes these analytical difficulties and
hence has a potential for applied research.6
2 Model
2.1 Setup
A good alternative x, if it exists, is in X := [0, 1] endowed with the Lebesgue measure.




f(x)dx ∈ (0, 1] denote the prior probability that the good alternative exists.
4Their uniqueness fails, however, without the assumption of symmetric or Markovian strategies. In fact,
there exists a continuum of equilibria, one for each welfare level between the social optimal and zero with
arbitrary division of rent. Matros and Smirnov (2016) and de Roos, Matros, Smirnov, and Wait (2018) look
into variants of this model with observable actions and with/without coordination.
5See, Halac, Kartik, and Liu (2016), McClellan (2019), Awaya and Krishna (2019), etc.
6There are several other novel alternative models of experimentation with multiple arms. Kremer, Man-
sour, and Perry (2014) present a model of two-alternative experimentation with a continuum of payoff levels.
Jovanovic and Rob (1990) and Callander (2011) offer models with a rich set of alternatives where individuals
draw observations on a sample path of a Brownian motion, and Wong (2020) extends the model to forward-
looking agents, but they do not consider strategic interactions of multiple players. Chen (2020) introduces
a game of experimentation in which players have random opportunities to revise their actions subject to
probabilistic breakdowns.
7The boundedness of the prior density can be relaxed at the cost of additional notations.
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Two players compete to find it in continuous time t ∈ T := [0, 1] without observing each
other’s activities. Each player can explore a subset of alternatives at each moment in time,
and the good alternative is discovered if it is contained in the set. The players face an
identical capacity constraint: the Lebesgue measure of the set of alternatives explored by
each player per unit time is constant and normalized to 1. The first player to find the good
alternative exclusively claims its return—a payoff of 1—and the two split it equally in the
case of simultaneous discovery. In all other cases, their payoffs are normalized to 0. There
is no temporal discounting. Once the good alternative is found, the discovery is publicly
announced and the game is over (alternatively, we can assume that the discovery is not
made public but the prize is taken away from the good alternative once discovered).
We emphasize that the continuum is an idealization of a large discrete set of alternatives;
hence, for example, two alternatives with labels 0.1 and 0.2 being mathematically “close”
does not mean their outcomes are “similar.”8
2.2 Strategy
The definition of strategies exploits two ideas: an outcome function approach to overcoming
the indeterminacy of continuous-time strategies and a distributional approach to handling
randomization.
Before introducing the formal definition, it is useful to explain why the intuition of “ex-
ploring one alternative per period” inherited from a discrete problem does not work. First,
this measure-preserving bijection between continuous time and continuous alternative space
is not a tractable object. Secondly, a good definition should naturally cover the case of an ab-
stract space of alternatives, but the existence of a measure-preserving bijection is not always
ensured, let alone equilibrium analysis in such bijections. Thirdly, the exploration activity
should be a correspondence that specifies for each moment in time a set of alternatives to
be explored. Instead of defining such a correspondence and dealing with an uncountable
union (over time) of measurable sets, it is more useful to specify outcome functions that
ambiguously determines the play of the game.
We shall formally define pure and mixed strategies, explaining the outcome function
approach. A reader may skip directly to Section 2.2.3 for the definition of distributional
strategies.
8Otherwise, the resulting strategic bandit problem with correlated alternatives is generally intractable.
See Callander (2011) and Wong (2020) for alternative models.
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2.2.1 Pure Strategy
A pure strategy is a function σ : T ×X → {0, 1} which specifies that an alternative x ∈ X
is explored at or before time t ∈ T if and only if σ(t, x) = 1.
Definition 1. A function σ : T ×X → {0, 1} is a pure strategy if it satisfies the following
four conditions:
1. Initial condition: σ(0, ·) = 0;
2. Monotonicity and right-continuity: σ(·, x) is non-decreasing and right continuous for
all x ∈ X;




σ(t, x)dx = t for all t ∈ T .
The four conditions are obvious requirements. The initial condition states that none of
the alternatives has been explored at the beginning of the game. The monotonicity condition
requires that, once an alternative has been explored, it will have been explored in the future
as well. The right continuity property, similar to that of a cumulative distribution function,
guarantees that the time at which an alternative x ∈ X is explored,
τ(x) := min{t : σ(t, x) = 1}, (2.1)
is well defined. The measurability condition furthers that τ : X → T is a measurable function
and τ−1(t), the set of alternatives to be explored at time t, is a measurable set. It is this
induced map τ−1 that instructs how the player should actually search, and hence the strategy
σ is operational. The set of alternatives explored up to any time t is given by




which is measurable.9 Lastly, the capacity constraint describes how quickly a player can
explore the space of alternatives. The measure of alternatives explored per unit of time is
normalized to 1. It implies the terminal condition: σ(1, ·) = 1 almost everywhere. Similar
9The measurability of the uncountable union of measurable sets in Equation (2.2) is an example of why it
is more convenient to define a pure strategy in this way than to define τ−1 directly as in discrete problems.
Note also that the measurability of the mapping τ−1 is irrelevant because it does not concern outcomes and
payoffs.
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to the study of Lebesgue-measurable functions, we identify a strategy σ up to a stationary
null set of X.10
2.2.2 Mixed Strategy
We introduce a probability space (Ω,F ,P) to describe randomization following Aumann
(1964). In addition, weak measurability is used to accommodate continuous time and con-
tinuous space. This allows the usage of the (Gelfand–Pettis) weak integral, which extends
Lebesgue integral to functional spaces.11
Definition 2. A mixed strategy on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) is a function σ : Ω×T ×
X → {0, 1} that satisfies the following conditions:
1. Initial condition: σ(ω, 0, ·) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω;
2. Monotonicity and right-continuity: σ(ω, ·, x) is non-decreasing and right continuous
for all ω ∈ Ω and x ∈ X;




σ(ω, t, x)dx = t for all t ∈ T , where the integral is the weak
integral.
The initial condition and the monotonicity and right-continuity condition are the realization-
by-realization generalizations of their counterparts in Definition 1 of pure strategies. The
measurability condition and the capacity constraint in Definition 2 for mixed strategies,
however, are weaker than their counterparts. They must hold when averaged over any mea-
surable event in Ω that has a positive probability under P, but not necessarily at each ω ∈ Ω.
If Ω is a singleton, a mixed strategy reduces to a pure strategy as defined in Definition 1.
With realization ω ∈ Ω, an alternative x ∈ X is explored at or before time t ∈ T if and
only if σ(ω, t, x) = 1, analogously to the pure strategy case. The stochastic time at which
alternative x is searched is a random variable on Ω given by τ(ω, x) = min{t : σ(ω, t, x) = 1}.
10Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) point out the indeterminacy of the continuous-time strategy when it is
written as a function of histories (including a player’s own past actions). The same issue is present here as
available actions at each moment in time depends on previous exploration. This issue is overcome by the
definition of pure strategies as paths of outcomes, and the assumption of unobservability of the opponent’s
actions.
11See Talagrand (1984) for an exposition of Gelfand–Pettis integral.
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2.2.3 Distributional Strategy
A mixed strategy in Definition 2 is explicit about randomization in continuous time and
continuous action space and hence is an operational instruction that the players can follow,
but it is not amenable to analysis. The essence of randomization is the induced distributions
that span the space of all feasible outcomes and payoffs. We therefore define a notion of
distributional strategy that specifies a distribution for each time t ∈ T .12
A distributional strategy is a function ρ : T×X → [0, 1] which specifies that an alternative
x ∈ X is explored by time t ∈ T with probability ρ(t, x).
Definition 3. A function ρ : T ×X → [0, 1] is a distributional strategy if it satisfies the
following conditions:
1. Initial condition: ρ(0, ·) = 0;
2. Monotonicity and right-continuity: ρ(·, x) is non-decreasing and right continuous for
all x ∈ X;




ρ(t, x)dx = t for all t ∈ T .
The four natural conditions need no further explanation. A distributional strategy ρ
reduces to a pure strategy if ρ(t, x) ∈ {0, 1}, following a comparison of Definition 1 and
Definition 3. The language of distributional strategies allows us to describe and analyze
the play of the game, but it does not offer a specific instruction to the players on how to
play it. The representation theorem below fills the gap. It shows that mixed strategies and
distributional strategies are outcome equivalent for all (t, x) ∈ T×X, and hence it is without
loss of generality to study equilibria and payoffs in terms of distributional strategies.
Theorem 1. 1. For every mixed strategy σ : Ω× T ×X → {0, 1} on a probability space
(Ω,F ,P), the function ρ, defined by ρ(t, x) := E[σ(·, t, x)] for t ∈ T and x ∈ X, is a
distributional strategy that represents σ, i.e., the probability of an alternative x ∈ X
being explored by t ∈ T under σ is ρ(t, x).
12Using distributions to describe randomizations in continuous-time games appears in Abreu and Gul
(2000) and Hendricks, Weiss, and Wilson (1988). The additional feature in this paper is the continuum of
alternatives, making a strategy different from a single distribution of stopping time as in a war of attrition
that has two actions.
8
2. For every distributional strategy ρ, there exists a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and a mixed
strategy σ : Ω × T × X → {0, 1} that implements ρ, i.e., E[σ(·, t, x)] = ρ(t, x) for all
t ∈ T and x ∈ X.
Theorem 1 is proved in Appendix A.1 by construction. We remark that the mixed-
strategy implementation is not unique.
Example 1. Under the Lebesgue probability space on Ω = [0, 1], both mixed strategies
σ1(ω, x, t) := 1{frac(x−ω)≤t} and σ2(ω, x, t) := 1{frac(x+ω)≤t}, where 1 denotes the indicator
function and frac(y) = y−byc denotes the fractional part of y, implement the same distribu-
tional strategy ρ(t, x) = t. Intuitively, according to the mixed strategy σ1, a player searches
to the right starting from x = ω, where ω is drawn uniformly from the interval [0, 1], and
continues at x = 0 after reaching x = 1, while according to σ2, a player searches in the other
direction starting from the same starting point.
2.3 Payoff
We abuse the notion by using −i to denote player i’s opponent. Given a profile of distribu-













∆tρi(t, x)∆tρ−i(t, x)dx. (2.3)
The first term in (2.3) is player i’s expected payoff from discovering the good alternative
before her opponent. The time integral is the Lebesgue–Stieltjes integral with respect to
the non-decreasing and right-continuous function t 7→ ρi(t, x).13 f(x) is the probability that
x is the good alternative, 1 − ρ−i(t, x) is the probability density that player −i has not
explored x by time t, and dtρi(t, x) is the instantaneous probability that player i explores
x at time t. The second term in (2.3) is player i’s expected payoff from simultaneously
discovering the good alternative with her opponent. For each x, the set Dx ⊂ T is the
at most countable set of discontinuity points of both ρi(·, x) and ρ−i(·, x). The function
∆tρi(t, x) := ρi(t, x) − ρi(t−, x) is the jump measure of the distributional strategy ρi(·, x)
on T , where ρi(t−, x) := lims↑t ρi(s, x). Thus,
∑
t∈Dx ∆tρi(t, x)∆tρ−i(t, x) is the probability
of simultaneous exploration of the alternative x. The second integral is well defined as the
integrand can be written as the limit of measurable functions.
13The Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure is obtained from µ((s, t]) := ρi(t, x)− ρi(s, x) for all 0 ≤ s < t ≤ 1.
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2.4 Belief Updating
Starting with a prior density f and knowing player −i adopts a distributional strategy ρ−i,
player i’s posterior density that x is a good alternative right after t is
g−i(t, x) := (1− ρ−i(t, x))f(x). (2.4)
We call g−i(t, x) player i’s (unnormalized) posterior distribution over X at time t. We
use the subscript “−i” because the posterior conditions only on the strategy of player −i,
but, of course, player i also knows her own search outcome which is not taken into account
in computing g−i.
By definition, g−i(0, x) = f(x) and g−i(t, x) is non-increasing in t for each x ∈ X.
Intuitively, as the alternatives are explored over time by her opponent −i, the posterior
distribution is pushed lower and lower, until it vanishes at t = 1. If an alternative x is
explored with higher probability by time t, it will have a lower density at t. Figure 2.1
illustrates the relationship between the distributional strategy, the prior distribution, and
the posterior distribution.








(a) distributional strategy ρ−i at a fixed time








(b) prior f and posterior g−i at a fixed time
Figure 2.1: A distributional strategy ρ−i and the posterior g−i, at a fixed time.
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3 Equilibration of Preemption and Prioritization
A profile of distributional strategies (ρi, ρ−i) is aNash equilibrium if ui(ρi, ρ−i) ≥ ui(ρ′i, ρ−i)
for each i ∈ {1, 2} and distributional strategy ρ′i.
3.1 Necessity of Randomization
A pure strategy is a distributional strategy with ρi(t, x) ∈ {0, 1}. We shall now argue that,
due to preemption motives, no player can play a pure strategy in a Nash equilibrium. Facing
any pure strategy ρ−i (e.g., it can be a strategy that prioritizes alternatives according to
their prior densities), player i can stay “one-step ahead” of her opponent. More precisely,
for ε > 0, let Aε := {x : ρ−i(ε, x) = 1} be the alternatives that will be explored by player −i
by time ε. Consider the following pure-strategy response for player i:
ρεi(t, x) :=

ρ−i(t− ε, x), if x /∈ Aε,
ρ−i((t− (1− ε))+, x), if x ∈ Aε,
(3.1)
where (·)+ is the positive part. With ρεi , player i will beat her opponent by ε time to the
prize if it is not in Aε. When ε is close to 0, player i’s payoff from this response is close to π
and her opponent’s payoff is close to 0. Thus in the putative equilibrium, player −i’s payoff
is 0. However, player −i can always imitate player i’s equilibrium strategy to guarantee
a payoff π/2. Therefore, equilibrium must involve randomization. We shall show that the
trade-off between prioritization and preemption is resolved in such a way that equilibrium
randomization levels off posterior densities over time.
3.2 Leveling Strategy
We first construct a Nash equilibrium in distributional strategies where the probability of
simultaneous discovery is zero, and then show that this is the unique Nash equilibrium.











g−i(t, x)dtρi(t, x)dx. (3.2)
Notice the posterior g−i(t, x) is also player i’s expected flow payoff from exploring an
alternative x at a given time t if she has not explored x yet.
In the candidate equilibrium, the posterior distribution gi(t, x) levels the prior f(x) over
11
time as illustrated in Figure 3.1. As such, we shall call it the leveling strategy. To construct










r Posterior at t
Posterior at t′ > t
Figure 3.1: The equilibrium posterior gi(t, x) levels the prior f(x) over time.
this strategy, it is instructive to first pin down the highest posterior as a function of time.
By the definition of posterior distribution in Equation (2.4), player −i’s strategy ρ−i and its
induced posterior g−i have the following relationship:
ρ−i(t, x) = 1−
g−i(t, x)
f(x) (3.3)








1{f(x)≥ḡ(t)}(x)dx = t (3.4)
for all t ∈ T. The motivation for Equation (3.4) is as follows. At time t, ḡ(t) is the highest
level of the posterior g−i(t, ·) across x ∈ X. It is achieved on {x ∈ X : f(x) ≥ ḡ(t)} as the
posterior is bounded above by the prior. Noting that the distributional strategy is related
to the posterior by 1 − ḡ(t)
f(x) in Equation (3.3), Equation (3.4) corresponds to the capacity
constraint in Definition 3.
Lemma 1. The leveling function exists and is unique, absolutely continuous, strictly de-
creasing, and convex.
12







for all t ∈ T and x ∈ X. It remains to verify that ρ̄ is a well-defined distributional strat-






1{f(x)≥y} is continuous and decreasing in y. Together with the conti-
nuity and monotonicity of ḡ, this property implies that ρ̄ is continuous in t and satisfies
the monotonicity and right-continuity condition. The function is also measurable in x and
hence ρ̄ satisfies the measurability condition. Finally, ρ̄ respects the capacity constraint by
Equation (3.4).
With an abuse of notation, we denote the posterior density induced by the leveling
strategy at time t as ḡ(t, x) := (1− ρ̄(t, x))f(x) and call it the leveling posterior at t. We
reiterate that it is player i’s leveling strategy ρ̄ that levels player −i’s posterior ḡ.
The relationship between the leveling strategy, the prior, and the leveling posterior is
demonstrated in Figure 3.2. The implementation of exploration over time is illustrated in
Figure 3.3.


























Figure 3.2: The leveling strategy ρ̄ and the posterior density ḡ, at a fixed time
13



















(a) contour plot of the intensity of explo-
ration ∂tρ̄













(b) a discretized realization of exploration
Figure 3.3: Exploration over time according to the leveling strategy ρ̄
3.3 Unique Equilibrium
The special randomization by the leveling strategy ρ̄ constitutes the unique Nash equilibrium
of the game.
Theorem 2. The profile (ρ̄, ρ̄) is the unique Nash equilibrium in distributional strategies.
We remark on several additional features of this equilibrium.
Remark 1. (Greedy Strategy) The equilibrium strategy is greedy in that a player will
explore only alternatives x with the highest posterior (or flow payoff) ḡ(t) at each time
t. Myopic best responses are determined solely by the posterior beliefs (the prioritization
motive), whereas dynamic best responses in addition take into account how fast posteriors
decline (the preemption motive). With leveling posterior, the posterior of the myopically
most promising alternatives declines at the same rate, and the leveling strategy is a best re-
sponse both myopically and dynamically. As we shall see in Section 4, the unique equilibrium
of the asymmetric problem is that the less capable player plays a greedy but not leveling
strategy, and the more capable player plays a leveling but not greedy strategy. The latter
levels the posteriors for her opponent but she randomizes over alternatives with different
posteriors.
Remark 2. (Empirical Implications) A qualitative implication of the unique equilibrium
is that both players can spend a lot of time on alternatives with low prior probabilities of
14
successes before exploring the more promising ones (see Figure 3.3). So the greedy best
response in the strategic setting is not greedy in a decision-theoretic setting. A player’s ran-
domized equilibrium strategy does not mean an actual randomization of the player. Rather,
it captures the uncertainty entertained by the opponent. Since both players randomize over
the same set of alternatives throughout, they will duplicate each other’s failure from start
to finish.14
Remark 3. (Discovery Time) Because of the greedy strategy, the highest level of posterior
at t, ḡ(t), is also the instantaneous probability with which each player makes a discovery at





Due to randomization, in terms of distributions of discovery time, this equilibrium first-
order stochastically dominates (i.e., is slower than) a coordinated exploration that prioritizes
alternatives according to their prior densities without the preemption motive.
Remark 4. (Payoff Sharing Rule) Since the unique equilibrium strategy is t-continuous,
Theorem 2 remains true for arbitrary payoff-sharing in the case of simultaneous discovery,
and it continues to hold verbatim even if the discoverer enjoys a larger, but not exclusive,
share of the prize.
Remark 5. (Space of Alternatives) By Equation (2.4), there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between functions of posterior densities and distributional strategies. Since only the
level of the highest posterior belief matters for the equilibrium characterization in distri-
butional strategies, Theorem 2 continues to hold verbatim when the space of alternatives
is multidimensional, with the same leveling strategy given by Equation (3.5) and the same
leveling function given by Equation (3.4) (the actual exploration activity of course depends
on the space of alternatives).
Remark 6. (Multiple Good Alternatives) Theorem 2 continues to hold verbatim if there
are multiple good alternatives that are independent and identically distributed accordingly
to f , assuming a player’s payoff is a weighted sum of the payoffs he receives from each
alternative. In fact, the result continues to hold with a continuum of good alternatives if
in addition we assume that all good alternatives corresponding to the same position x are
discovered at once when x is searched (this has a zero probability if the number of good
14See, e.g., Akcigit and Liu (2015) for evidence for wasteful duplications.
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alternatives is finite). A formal treatment of a continuum of independent random variables
again requires the notion of weak integral.
3.3.1 Verification
We shall show that (ρ̄, ρ̄) is a Nash equilibrium. Suppose that player −i plays the lev-
eling strategy ρ̄. The probability of simultaneous discovery is zero since the strategy is







We shall show that ui(ρi, ρ̄) ≤ ui(ρ̄, ρ̄) for any strategy ρi. By construction in Equation (3.5),







For x ∈ X, let κx ∈ ∆(T ) be the Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure induced by ρi(·, x). Then






ρi(t, x)dx = t, (3.8)



























where the first equality is by the definition of Lebesgue–Stieltjes integration and the second
equality follows from Fubini’s theorem. Combining (3.7) and (3.9), player i’s payoff of playing





















where the first equality is due to Equation (3.2), the second equality holds because ρ̄(t, x) > 0
only if ḡ(t, x) = ḡ(t), and the third equality follows from Equation (3.9).
Combining (3.10) and (3.11), we have shown that ui(ρi, ρ̄) ≤ ui(ρ̄, ρ̄). By symmetry, the







f(x)dx = π/2. (3.12)
3.3.2 Uniqueness
The formal proof of uniqueness is contained in Appendix A.3. The intuition can be under-
stood as follows. First, note that ui(ρi, ρ̄) ≤ π/2 for any ρi and hence, ui(ρ̄, ρi) ≥ π/2 in the
constant-sum game. The latter inequality means that the leveling strategy ρ̄ guarantees a
payoff of π/2. It therefore suffices to show that any non-leveling strategy cannot ensure π/2.
For such a strategy, there must exist an interval of time over which the posterior declines
faster than the leveling posterior in a positive measure set and slower in another positive
measure set, due to the capacity constraint. One can then modify the leveling strategy to
preempt this strategy by prioritizing the former set at the expense of the latter, in the spirit
of the “one-step-ahead” strategy in Equation (3.1), to achieve a higher payoff.
4 Impact of Asymmetric Capacities
Suppose that the two players have different capacities: player 1 can explore measure 1 of
alternatives per unit of time, while player 2 explores measure α ∈ (0, 1] of alternatives per
unit of time. That is, player 1 (the “strong” player, she) is more capable or more resourceful
than player 2 (the “weak” player, he) at exploration. We will refer to α as player 2’s capacity.




ρα2 (t, x)dx = αt (4.1)
for all t ∈ T, in addition to the first three conditions in Definition 3. Note that the strong
player, player 1, will have explored all alternatives x ∈ X by time t = 1 and so exploration




Consider the leveling strategy ρ̄ in the symmetric case. Then αρ̄ is a distributional strategy
for player 2 that satisfies the new capacity constraint of Equation (4.1). It is special in that
any given alternative x is explored with probability α. The strategy αρ̄ no longer levels the
posterior as ρ̄ does. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the difference.
















Figure 4.1: The strategy profile (ρ̄, αρ̄) and the corresponding posterior densities, at a fixed
time. Player 2 is half as capable as player 1, i.e., α = 1/2.
Theorem 3. The profile of distributional strategies (ρ̄, αρ̄) is the unique Nash equilibrium





player 2’s payoff is 12απ.
Both the formal proof and the proof idea for Theorem 3 are relegated to Appendix A.4.
The dynamics and payoff distributions in this unique equilibrium have several interesting
features.
Remark 7. (Extensive vs. Intensive Exploration) Although the two players differ in
their speeds of exploration, they randomize over the same expanding set of alternatives,
modulo the alternatives they have respectively explored. This is clear as ρ̄ and αρ̄ have
the same support. So the weak player explores as extensively as the strong player does.
In addition, although a priori player 2 can choose to explore a subset of alternatives with
probability greater than α, he will not do so in equilibrium. Therefore, the weak player con-
ducts extensive exploration instead of intensive exploration when facing a disadvantageous
18
capacity constraint.15
Remark 8. (Greedy vs. Non-Greedy) As in the symmetric case, the strong player
1’s leveling strategy ρ̄ leads to a leveling posterior ḡ(t, x) = (1 − ρ̄(t, x))f(x) that flattens
the prior density over time. This posterior makes the greedy strategy a best response for
the weak player 2. In contrast to the symmetric case, the posterior (1 − αρ̄(t, x))f(x)
induced by the equilibrium strategy αρ̄ of player 2 is not flat over the set of alternatives
{x ∈ X : f(x) ≥ ḡ(t)} as observed in Figure 4.1; the strong player is always more optimistic
than the weak player. Thus player 1 cannot play a greedy strategy. However, player 1’s
posterior decreases at a constant rate across these alternatives. The equal option values
allow her to randomize. Therefore, the strong player’s equilibrium strategy is leveling but
not greedy, and the weak player’s strategy is greedy but not leveling.
Remark 9. (Disproportionate Payoff Division) The ratio of players’ equilibrium payoffs
(2 − α) : α is greater than the ratio of capacities 1 : α. It is as if player 1 monopolizes a
fraction 1 − α of the total surplus and splits the remaining fraction evenly with player 2.
For example, if α = 12 , i.e., the strong player is twice as fast as the weak player, the payoff
share is (34 ,
1
4). The strong player’s payoff is three times as much as the weak player’s. In
comparison, in a three-player game in which the more resourceful player is split into two




3) in a symmetric three-player equilibrium, as
we shall show in the next section. The excess payoff of player 1 beyond the sum of her two
selves is due to the pooled information of the two: knowing which alternatives have been
explored by herself, player 1 does better as one big player than an ensemble of smaller selves
who may duplicate explorations by their peers.
4.2 Discovery Time
We now investigate the impact of asymmetry from a different angle. We fix the total ex-
ploration capacity to be 2 (as in the symmetric case), and varies the asymmetry between
the two players. Its payoff impact has been clarified in Remark 9. The question is how this
asymmetry affects the distribution of discovery time of the good alternative, which is a more
relevant measurement of social value of exploration. We show that asymmetry speeds up
the discovery.
15If we model each alternative as a Poisson process with the arrival rate controlled by resources allocated
to the alternative (see Section 5.1), the weak player would cover as many alternatives as the strong player
does, but would spend less resource on each alternative.
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Formally, let β ∈ [1, 2) and consider the game in which the strong player has capacity
β and the weak player has capacity 2 − β ∈ (0, 1]. Theorem 3 implies that in the unique
equilibrium, player 1 plays the strategy ρ1(t, x) = ρ̄(βt, x) with a leveling posterior ḡ(βt)
and player 2 plays ρ2(t, x) = 1−ββ ρ̄(βt, x).
For t ≥ 1/β, the strong player has exhausted all alternatives so the probability of discov-




(f(x)− ḡ(βt)) 1{f(x)≥ḡ(βt)}dx+ (2− β)tḡ(βt).
The probability is computed using the following idea: first let the strong player search until
she levels the posterior down to ḡ(βt), and then let the weak player search for a period with
length t conditional on the strong player’s failure to make a discovery.
Theorem 4. The distribution of discovery time is decreasing in β in the first-order stochastic
dominance sense.






















Figure 4.2: Distribution of discovery time for the coordinated exploration and equilibria with
different divisions of capacity.
Figure 4.2 demonstrates how the the distribution of discovery time varies with β. The
symmetric division of exploration capacity (when competition, and hence the preemptive
incentive, is the most intense) leads to the slowest discovery time P1, and the coordinated
exploration (when only prioritization incentive prevails) has the fastest discovery time P2.
Distributions of discovery time under asymmetric divisions of search capacity lie in between
the two extremes.
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Remark 10. (Discontinuity) It is interesting to note that Pβ converges to P1 pointwise as
β → 1, but it does not converge to P2 as β → 2. The discontinuity at β = 2 arises because
the strong player must level the posteriors (with leveling posterior ḡ(2t) in the limit) for the
weak player to randomize. So the incentive of preemption does not vanish even in the limit.
But there is no discontinuity in payoffs as the strong player explores all alternatives when
the weak player’s capacity vanishes. Indeed, in the limit of one monopolistic player with
capacity 2, all exploration strategies are optimal.
5 Further Results
The main model studies strategic exploration in the simplest setting, and its analysis and
results are invariant to seemingly non-vacuous modifications as seen in Remarks 4–6. The
model is amenable to enrichment to study search and learning in various settings, and we shall
work out several cases that are of interest for applications, assuming symmetric capacities.
We shall also establish comparative statics results with respect to the number of players and
variations of prior distributions.
5.1 Poisson Learning
In the main model, players learn whether a given alternative is good instantaneously upon
exploration. In this section, we consider the case where discovery is not immediate; instead,
each alternative x ∈ X represents a Poisson process with conclusive signals, and the arrival
rate is independent of whether x is a good alternative or not.16 The arrival of signals is
controlled by each player: conditional on the player not receiving any signals from a given
alternative, the more resources she has spent on the alternative, the higher the probability
of signal arrival from that alternative is for her. Specifically, we assume that the arrival
rate of signals from an alternative is proportional to the flow rate of resources spent on the
alternative. A player cannot explore all alternatives instantly; the total amount of resources
available per unit of time is normalized to 1.
Formally, let r(t, x) be the cumulative amount of resources a player spends on the al-
ternative x by time t conditional on receiving no signal before t. The probability of signal
arrival, which reveals the state of x, by time t is 1 − e−r(t,x). If r(·, x) is differentiable in t,
the partial derivative ∂tr(t, x) is the arrival rate of the potentially non-stationary Poisson
16See, e.g., Akcigit and Liu (2015) for a model of a binary confirmatory process with independent arrival
rate.
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process associated with alternative x.
The function r : T ×X → R+∪{∞} is a resource allocation strategy if the following four
conditions are satisfied:
1. Initial condition: r(0, x) = 0 for all x ∈ X;
2. Monotonicity and right-continuity: r(·, x) is increasing and right-continuous for all
x ∈ X;







dx = t for all t ∈ T .
The first three conditions need no further explanations. The capacity constraint warrants
an elaboration. The strategy r(t, x) may not be the actual amount of resources spent on
alternative x by time t, because it conditions on no signal arrival. No more resources will
be spent once a signal arrives. The expected amount of resources spent on alternative x by
time t is given by
ˆ r(t,x)
0
e−qdq = 1− e−r(t,x),
where e−q is the probability of no signal being received given the cumulative amount of
resources q. As the arrival of Poisson signals is independent across alternatives, the law
of large numbers applies and the capacity constraint applies to the expected amount of
resources.17
Given player i’s resource allocation strategy ri, we write the probability of signal ar-
rival from alternative x by time t as ρi(t, x) := 1 − e−ri(t,x) ∈ [0, 1]. With this one-to-one
relationship between ri and ρi, it is immediate that ri is a resource allocation strategy if
and only if ρi is a distributional strategy that satisfies the four conditions in Definition 3.
Player i’s expected payoff from a profile (ri, r−i) is the same as ui(ρi, ρ−i) as defined in Equa-
tion (2.3). Therefore, the game with Poisson learning is isomorphic to the main model with
instantaneous arrival. Define a resource allocation strategy
r := − log (1− ρ) ,
17As more signals arrive, the player concentrates his resource on the remaining alternatives, expediting
the arrival of Poisson signals over those alternatives. At t = 1, the capacity constraint can be satisfied if and
only if r(1, x) =∞ almost everywhere. The relevant temporal domain for this game is equal to the expected
resources spent to obtain a signal, i.e., T = [0, 1].
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where ρ is the leveling strategy. The following result is immediate from Theorem 2.
Theorem 5. With Poisson learning, the profile of resource allocation strategy (r̄, r̄) is the
unique Nash equilibrium.
We should note that Remarks 4–6 are valid here. The equilibrium characterization in
resource allocation strategies is invariant to the space of alternatives, payoff-sharing rules,
and the multiplicity of good alternatives.
5.2 Multiple Players
Suppose that there are n symmetric players, where n ≥ 2. The set of strategies available to
each of them is still given by Definition 3. Denote a distributional strategy of player i by ρi,
and define ρ−i := 1 −
∏
j 6=i(1 − ρj). Then ρ−i(t, x) is the probability that x is searched up
to time t by at least one of player i’s opponents. The posterior induced by ρ−i is given by
g−i(t, x) := (1 − ρ−i(t, x))f(x). With this notation, the payoff of player i is again given by
Equation (2.3). The probability of simultaneous discovery involving player i is zero if ρi is
continuous in t. In that case, the payoff can be simplified to Equation (3.2).
We consider the symmetric strategy profile such that the posterior g−i is leveling for every







1{f(x)≥ḡ(t)}(x)dx = t (5.1)
for all t ∈ T. The proof of existence and uniqueness of ḡ is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1.







satisfies the capacity constraint.
Theorem 6. The profile of distributional strategies (ρ̄, ..., ρ̄) is the unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium of the game with n players.
Theorem 6 characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium, but does not establish the
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium which does not hold for n > 2. We present an example of an
asymmetric equilibrium in which equilibrium payoffs are also unequal for symmetric players.
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Example 2. Take a uniform prior f ≡ 1 and consider n = 5. Partition the space X = [0, 1]
into two halves: X1 := [0, 12) and X2 := [
1




min{2t, 1}, if x ∈ Xi,
max{2t− 1, 0}, if x ∈ Xi+1,
where X3 := X1. Player 1 searches uniformly over the left half X1 until the alternatives are
exhausted at t = 12 , and then the other half X2. Player 2 searches in the reverse order. It
can be verified that (ρ1, ρ2, ρ1, ρ2, ρ1) is a Nash equilibrium. Since the discovery must occur
before t = 12 , the distribution of discovery time in this equilibrium is different from the one
described in Theorem 6. Moreover, despite symmetric capacities, the equilibrium payoffs are
asymmetric: player 1, 3, and 5 enjoy an expected payoff of 16 while player 2 and 4 have an
expected payoff of 14 .
As the number of players increase, the effect of preemption will increase and there will
be more duplicated search. But overall discovery is hastened.
Theorem 7. In this class of symmetric equilibria, the distribution of discovery time is
decreasing in n in the first-order stochastic dominance sense.
5.3 Impact of Prior Beliefs
With the probability of existence of a good alternative π fixed, how does the prior distribution
f affect the equilibrium discovery? In equilibrium, players concentrate their effort on the
area with the highest equilibrium posteriors. If the prior distribution is more spread out or
evenly distributed over X, the good alternative should be discovered later. We shall now
formalize this notion of comparative statics.
Denote λ as the Lebesgue measure. For any prior distribution f , let λ◦f−1 be the pushfor-
ward measure over R+. Note that λ◦f−1(R+) = λ([0, 1]) = 1, λ◦f−1 is a probability measure.
The distribution induced by λ ◦ f−1 has an expectation of
´
R+ ydλ ◦ f
−1 =
´
[0,1] f(x)dλ = π.
By definition, the pushforward measure is the distribution of prior density. For example,
when the good alternative, if exists, is uniformly distributed over X, i.e., f(x) is a constant,
then λ◦f−1 assigns probability 1 to a single point. This is the case where the good alternative
is most evenly distributed over X = [0, 1].
Definition 4. Let f1 and f2 be two prior distributions. We say that f2 is more even than
f1 if λ ◦ f−11 is a mean-preserving spread of λ ◦ f−12 .
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Figure 5.1 below illustrates the partial order of evenness.








(a) prior density functions









Figure 5.1: Two distributions f1 and f2, where f2 is more even than f1.
Theorem 8. Consider the symmetric Nash equilibrium (ρ̄, ..., ρ̄) for the game with n players.
If f2 is more even than f1, then the distribution of equilibrium discovery time associated with
f2 first-order stochastically dominates that associated with f1, i.e., the good alternative is
discovered later with f2 than with f1.
The comparative statics result on discovery times remains true if f2 second-order/first-
order stochastically dominates f2, but the comparison is more meaningful holding the mean
π fixed.
5.4 Time Preference and Search Cost
Suppose that both players have a common time preference function δ : T → (0,+∞).
That is, a discovery at t is worth δ(t) at time 0. The main model and all of its variants
correspond to the case where δ is constant. The equilibrium we characterized in Theorem 2
remains an equilibrium for any time preference function δ, but we cannot establish a general
uniqueness result. We can actually show that the equilibrium is unique if δ is strictly
increasing, i.e., the prize is getting bigger over time. This class of time preference describes,
for example, two competing companies work on a drug with a rising price. In the unique
equilibrium, the probability of discovery by each player ḡ decreases over time. The players
25
fail to coordinate and wait till the prize becomes larger—a manifestation of destructive
preemption incentives—despite their preference for delayed discoveries.
Alternatively, we can introduce a flow cost of time c > 0. We need to make the explicit
assumption that a discovery is made public immediately and ends the game. It is readily
verified that if π = 1 and c < 1/2, the equilibrium we have constructed in Theorem 2 remains
an equilibrium. If π < 1, there will be learning about the existence of the good alternative,
and exploration will stop before all alternatives are exhausted.
26
References
Abreu, Dilip and Faruk Gul (2000). “Bargaining and reputation”. In: Econometrica 68.1,
pp. 85–117.
Akcigit, Ufuk and Qingmin Liu (2015). “The role of information in innovation and compe-
tition”. In: Journal of the European Economic Association 14.4, pp. 828–870.
Aumann, Robert J (1964). “Mixed and behavior strategies in infinite extensive games”. In:
Advances in Game Theory 52, pp. 627–650.
Awaya, Yu and Vijay Krishna (2019). “Startups and Upstarts: Disadvantageous Information
in R&D”. In: Working Paper, University of Rochester and Penn State University.
Bolton, Patrick and Christopher Harris (1999). “Strategic experimentation”. In: Economet-
rica 67.2, pp. 349–374.
Callander, Steven (2011). “Searching and learning by trial and error”. In: American Economic
Review 101.6, pp. 2277–2308.
Chatterjee, Kalyan and Robert Evans (2004). “Rivals’ search for buried treasure: competition
and duplication in R&D”. In: RAND Journal of Economics, pp. 160–183.
Chen, Yi (2020). “A revision game of experimentation on a common threshold”. In: Journal
of Economic Theory 186, pp. 104–997.
de Roos, Nicolas, Alexander Matros, Vladimir Smirnov, and Andrew Wait (2018). “Ship-
wrecks and treasure hunters”. In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 90, pp. 259–
283.
Fershtman, Chaim and Ariel Rubinstein (1997). “A simple model of equilibrium in search
procedures”. In: Journal of Economic Theory 72.2, pp. 432–441.
Halac, Marina, Navin Kartik, and Qingmin Liu (2016). “Optimal contracts for experimen-
tation”. In: The Review of Economic Studies 83.3, pp. 1040–1091.
Hendricks, Ken, Andrew Weiss, and Charles Wilson (1988). “The war of attrition in con-
tinuous time with complete information”. In: International Economic Review, pp. 663–
680.
Jovanovic, Boyan and Rafael Rob (1990). “Long waves and short waves: Growth through
intensive and extensive search”. In: Econometrica, pp. 1391–1409.
Keller, Godfrey, Sven Rady, and Martin Cripps (2005). “Strategic experimentation with
exponential bandits”. In: Econometrica 73.1, pp. 39–68.
Klein, Nicolas and Sven Rady (2011). “Negatively correlated bandits”. In: The Review of
Economic Studies 78.2, pp. 693–732.
Kleinberg, Jon M (1994). “On-line Search in a Simple Polygon”. In: SODA. Vol. 94, pp. 8–15.
27
Kremer, Ilan, Yishay Mansour, and Motty Perry (2014). “Implementing the wisdom of the
crowd”. In: Journal of Political Economy 122, pp. 988–1012.
Matros, Alexander, Natalia Ponomareva, Vladimir Smirnov, and AndrewWait (2019). “Search
without observability”. In: Working Paper, University of Sydney.
Matros, Alexander and Vladimir Smirnov (2016). “Duplicative search”. In: Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior 99, pp. 1–22.
McClellan, Andrew (2019). “Experimentation and approval mechanisms”. In:Working Paper,
University of Chicago.
Megow, Nicole, Kurt Mehlhorn, and Pascal Schweitzer (2012). “Online graph exploration:
New results on old and new algorithms”. In: Theoretical Computer Science 463, pp. 62–
72.
Simon, Leo K. and Maxwell B. Stinchcombe (1989). “Extensive form games in continuous
time: Pure strategies”. In: Econometrica 57, pp. 1171–1214.
Talagrand, Michel (1984). “Pettis integral and measure theory”. In:Memoirs of the American
Mathematical Society.
Wong, Yu Fu (2020). “Spatial Experimentation”. In: Working Paper, Columbia University.
28
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The first part of Theorem 1 follows directly from the definitions of the weak measur-
ability and the weak integral so its proof is omitted.
We show the second part by construction. By the Kolmogorov extension theorem, there
exists a probability triple (Ω,F ,P) in which random variables rx ∼ U(0, 1) are i.i.d. across
x ∈ X. Define candidate mixed strategy σ(ω, t, x) := 1{rx(ω)≤ρ(t,x)}(ω, t, x). By construction,
it satisfies the initial condition and the monotonicity and right-continuity condition, and
implements the search density.
Fix t ∈ [0, 1]. We shall show that x 7→ σ(·, t, x) ∈ L2(Ω) is weak-integrable over the
Lebesgue measure with integral t. The dual space of L2(Ω) is isomorphic to itself by the Riesz
representation theorem. Every element Z ∈ L2(Ω) operates on Y ∈ L2(Ω) via ZY = E[ZY ].
Since σ(·, x, t) ∈ {0, 1}, its variance is bounded by 1/4. The pairwise independence of
{σ(·, t, x) : x ∈ X} implies that {σ(·, t, x) − ρ(t, x) : x ∈ X} is an orthogonal set in L2(Ω).






(E[Z(σ(·, t, xn)− ρ(t, xn))])2
4V ar[σ(·, t, x)] ≥
∞∑
n=1
(E[Z(σ(·, t, xn)− ρ(t, xn))])2
which implies that E[Z(σ(·, t, x) − ρ(t, x))] = 0, or E[Zσ(·, t, x)] = E[Z]ρ(t, x), everywhere




ρ(t, x)dx = t, satisfying the capacity constraint.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1














1{f(x)≥y}(x) is decreasing in y and strictly so for f(x) > y,
which has positive measure for y < sup f . Thus, h is strictly decreasing. In addition, the
integrand is continuous, and therefore h is continuous by the dominated convergence theorem.
The convexity of h also follows from that of the integrand.
The function h is continuous and strictly decreasing with h(0) = 1 and h(sup f) = 0.
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Therefore, there exists a unique, continuous, and strictly decreasing function ḡ = h−1 that
solves Equation (3.4). Since h is strictly decreasing, its inverse ḡ is also convex. The absolute
continuity of ḡ follows from its continuity and convexity.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Overview. The verification of the Nash equilibrium is provided in the main text. The
uniqueness follows from three lemmas in this section. Lemma 2 states that, in equilibrium,
each player can only search over the set of alternatives, which we call the upper contour set
of f , that the leveling strategy randomizes over. Otherwise, he will enjoy payoff lower than
π/2 against the leveling strategy.
Lemma 3 is key to Theorem 2. It states that, in equilibrium, the posterior declines fastest
on the upper contour set. If instead the posterior declined slower in some subset of the upper
contour set over the other during a period of time, the opponent could devise a modified
leveling strategy that searches the former in place of the latter just before the period, and
vice versa just after the period. The modification generalizes the “one-step ahead” strategy
in Equation (3.1). The opponent’s strategy would then preempt the player’s strategy and
yield higher payoff than the leveling strategy, which cannot be true in equilibrium in a
constant-sum game.
Lemma 3 has two useful implications. Corollary 1 establishes the t-continuity of the
equilibrium strategy. According to Lemma 3, the posterior decreases fastest over the upper
contour set. Therefore, the posterior for those alternatives must all drop discontinuously.
This violates the capacity constraint. Corollary 2 states that the decrease in posterior must
be equal over the upper contour set. This is immediate by applying Lemma 3 twice.
Lemma 4 computes the equilibrium posterior within the upper contour set. As the de-
crease in posterior is the constant across the set of alternatives according to Corollary 2,
the posterior is pinned down by the capacity constraint and the initial condition, which is
exactly the leveling posterior defined by the leveling strategy.





t∈Dx ∆tρi∆tρ−idx be the payoff from
simultaneous discoveries. We write ρ−−i(t, x) := lims↑t ρ−i(s, x) in place of ρ−i(t−, x) when




























In particular, it holds as an equality whenever one of the strategies is t-continuous.
As shown in Equation (3.11) and Equation (3.12) in the main text, the Nash equilibrium











As the game is constant-sum, the equilibrium strategies in any Nash equilibrium must achieve
the above payoff.
For t ∈ T , denote H(t) := {x ∈ X : f(x) ≥ ḡ(t)} as the upper contour set of f and
HC(t) := X\H(t) as its complement.
Lemma 2. Let (ρ1, ρ2) be a Nash equilibrium. Then, for all t0 ∈ T and i ∈ {1, 2}, ρi(t0, x) =
0 for x ∈ HC(t0) almost everywhere.
Proof. The statement for t0 = 0 follows from the initial condition. Suppose there exists time
t0 ∈ (0, 1], positive-measure set A ⊂ HC(t0) such that ρi(t0, x) > 0 for all x ∈ A. Then the
payoff of player i against a leveling strategy of player −i is strictly below the equilibrium
payoff:




























(g−i(t, x)− g(t)) dtρi(t, x)dx
< 0.
The second equality is due to Equation (3.9). The weak inequality follows from g−i(t, x) ≤
ḡ(t) for all t ∈ T and x ∈ X, and the strict one from the fact that g−i(t, x) < g(t) for all
t ≤ t0 and ρi(t0, x) > 0 for all x ∈ A.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ T , and x ∈ X, denote gi(t−, x) := lims↑t gi(s, x).
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Lemma 3. Let (ρ1, ρ2) be a Nash equilibrium. For 0 < t0 < t1 ≤ t2 < 1 and i ∈ {1, 2},
gi(t2, xA)− gi(t−1 , xA) ≥ gi(t2, xB)− gi(t−1 , xB)
for xA ∈ X and xB ∈ H(t0) almost everywhere.
Proof. For xA ∈ HC(t2) almost everywhere, Lemma 2 implies gi(t2, xA) − gi(t−1 , xA) = 0 so
the inequality follows from the monotonicity condition.
Suppose there exists positive-measure setsA ⊂ H(t2) andB ⊂ H(t0) such that gi(t2, xA)−
gi(t−1 , xA) < gi(t2, xB)−gi(t−1 , xB) for all xA ∈ A, xB ∈ B. Without loss of generality, assume









> 0; if this is not the case, replace the sets respectively by some positive-measure
subsets. Fix ε ∈ (0, 1). We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: A Modified Leveling Strategy.
Let ε1 := (t1− t0)ε > 0. Let ε2 > 0 be a solution to ḡ(t1− ε1)− ḡ(t1) = ḡ(t2)− ḡ(t2 + ε2).
For sufficiently small ε, it exists and is unique by the continuity and monotonicity of ḡ. In
addition, 0 < t1− ε1 and t2 + ε2 < 1. The left- and right-differentiability of ḡ from Lemma 1
imply that ε1∂−t ḡ(t1) = ε2∂+t ḡ(t2) + o(ε). Let ∆1t := [t1 − ε1, t1] and ∆2t := [t2, t2 + ε2].
Consider the following modified leveling strategy ρ̃−i, which, comparing to the leveling
strategy, searches A in expense of B over ∆1t, and vice versa over ∆2t.
If t ∈ ∆1t, let
ρ̃−i(t, x) :=

ρ̄(t, x) + ḡ(t1−ε1)−ḡ(t)
f(x) , if x ∈ A;
ρ̄(t1 − ε1, x), if x ∈ B.
If t ∈ (t1, t2), let
ρ̃−i(t, x) :=

ρ̄(t, x) + ḡ(t1−ε1)−ḡ(t1)
f(x) , if x ∈ A;
ρ̄(t, x)− ḡ(t1−ε1)−ḡ(t1)
f(x) , if x ∈ B.
If t ∈ ∆2t, let
ρ̃−i(t, x) :=





f(x) , if x ∈ B.
If x /∈ A ∪B or t /∈ [t1 − ε1, t2 + ε2], let ρ̃−i(t, x) := ρ̄(t, x).
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Note that the modified strategy ρ̃−i is a strategy for player −i, and in particular that it










. It can be verified to be t-continuous.
Step 2: Payoffs from the Modified Leveling Strategy.




on B over ∆1t, and vice versa over ∆2t. It is zero otherwise. The change in utility of the





















































1 , x)dx+ o(ε),
where the second equality is due to the dominated convergence theorem. The equation states
that, over short time interval ∆1t, both gi and ∂−t ḡ−i can be taken as constants with respect
to time. The same can be applied to the other three terms.















































































Therefore, there exists ε > 0 sufficiently small such that, against ρi, the modified leveling
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strategy ρ̃−i yields strictly higher payoff than leveling strategy, which guarantees the maxmin
payoff.
The first corollary below establishes the t-continuity of the equilibrium strategy. Accord-
ing to Lemma 3, the posterior decreases fastest over the upper contour set H. Therefore,
the posterior for those alternatives must all drop discontinuously. This violates the capacity
constraint.
Corollary 1. In any Nash equilibrium, player i’s strategy ρi is t-continuous.
Proof. The statement for t = 0 follows from the monotonicity and right-continuity condition,
and that for t = 1 is without loss because the set {x ∈ X : ρi(1, x)− ρi(1−, x) > 0} is null.
Suppose there exists positive-measure set B ⊂ X such that ρi, or equivalently gi, is not
t-continuous on (0, 1)×B. Without loss of generality, there exists b < 0 and ε ∈ (0, 1) such
that, for all x ∈ B, there is tx ∈ (ε, 1) satisfying
gi(tx, x)− gi(t−x , x) ≤ b.
The compactness of [ε, 1] implies that, for any δ > 0, there exists tδ, t̄δ ∈ (ε, 1) with tδ < t̄δ
and t̄δ − tδ < δ, and positive-measure subset Bδ ⊂ B such that
gi(t̄δ, x)− gi(t−δ , x) ≤ b.
Lemma 3 implies that ρi(t̄δ, x)−ρi(t−δ , x) ≥ −b/f(x) for all x ∈ H(ε), a positive-measure




ρi(t̄δ, x)− ρi(t−δ , x)dx ≥
ˆ
H(ε)





which yields a contradiction as δ ↓ 0.
Corollary 2. In any Nash equilibrium, for 0 < t1 < t2 ≤ 1,
gi(t2, xA)− gi(t1, xA) = gi(t2, xB)− gi(t1, xB)
for xA, xB ∈ H(t1) almost everywhere.
Proof. Assume t2 < 1. For any t ∈ (t1, t2), H(t1) ⊂ H(t). Lemma 3 thus gives the equality
gi(t2, xA)− gi(t, xA) = gi(t2, xB)− gi(t, xB)
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for xA, xB ∈ H(t1) almost everywhere. The statement is obtained by taking a countable
sequence t ↑ t1, noting that gi is t-continuous by Corollary 1.
The boundary case t2 = 1 follows similarly by taking a countable sequence t2 ↑ 1.
Lemma 4. In any Nash equilibrium, for i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ T , gi(t, x) = ḡ(t) for x ∈ H(t)
almost everywhere.
Proof. Once the statement is proven for t ∈ (0, 1], it extends to the endpoint t = 0 because
of the monotonicity and right-continuity condition.
For t ∈ (0, 1], define g̃i(t) := supx∈H(t) gi(t, x). The terminal condition implies g̃i(1) = 0.
Corollary 2 with t2 = 1 reads
g̃i(t) = gi(t, x)− gi(1, x) = gi(t, x) (A.3)
for all x ∈ H(t) almost everywhere.
We now derive the right-derivative ∂+t g̃i. For 0 < t1 < t2 < 1, the capacity constraint
gives
t2 − t1 =
ˆ
H(t1)
ρi(t2, x)− ρi(t1, x)dx+
ˆ
H(t2)\H(t1)





















The inequality is due to Lemma 3. Rearranging the terms,















where the third inequality is due to the definition of H. The function g̃i is Lipschitz and
thus absolutely continuous on (0, 1).
Take t2 ↓ t1. Since H(t2) ↓ H(t1) in the set-inclusion sense, the dominated convergence
theorem states that |H(t2)\H(t1)| ↓ 0. The second term in Equation (A.4) is dominated by
ˆ
H(t2)\H(t1)







) = o(t2 − t1).
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The right-derivative of g̃i is thus given by









Since ḡ also satisfies the first two lemmas and the two corollaries, an analogous calculation
shows that







Therefore, ḡ = g̃i + C for some constant C ∈ R. The boundary condition at t = 1 is
limt↑1 g̃i(t) = ḡ(1) = 0 which implies C = 0.
Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 imply that, for all t ∈ T , gi(t, ·) = ḡ(t, ·) almost everywhere.
There exists a full measure set over which the inequality holds for all t ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q. The
theorem then follows from the monotonicity and right-continuity condition.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
A.4.1 Proof Strategy
The idea of the proof of Theorem 3 is as follows. For every strategy ρα2 of player 2, define
ρ2 := ρα2/α. It is easy to verify that ρ2 : T × X → [0, 1/α] satisfies the four conditions of
Definition 3. It differs from a distributional strategy in its codomain [0, 1/α] instead of [0, 1].
We shall call ρ2 : T ×X → [0, 1/α] a normalized strategy. Players’ payoffs from the strategy
profile (ρ1, ρα2 ) can be rewritten as payoffs from (ρ1, ρ2) as follows:
u1(ρ1, ρα2 ) = (1− α)π + αu1(ρ1, ρ2); (A.5)
u2(ρα2 , ρ1) = αu2(ρ2, ρ1). (A.6)
Therefore, the payoff functions under asymmetric capacity are increasing affine transforma-
tions of those with a normalized strategy of player 2. Thus, the game with asymmetric
capacity is strategically equivalent to the one with a normalized strategy, and the existence
and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the game with asymmetric players will follow
from their counterparts in the game with normalized strategies. But the latter is not quite
the same as the symmetric game because of the codomain of the normalized strategy ρ2,
i.e., it is not a priori clear that ρ2(1, ·) = 1 in equilibrium. This gap is closed using the
following proof strategy. We decompose the maximization over normalized strategies into
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two components: the (normalized) probability of exploration by the end of the game ρ2(1, ·),
and the implementation of the exploration given this probability. We shall show that, for
any probability of exploration, a generalized leveling strategy is optimal for player 2, and his
payoff is uniquely maximized at ρ2(1, ·) = 1 given the leveling strategy.
A.4.2 Formal Proof
We first derive Equation (A.5) and Equation (A.6) as follows.


































= (1− α)π + αu1(ρ1, ρ2).















Definition 5 (Timing game). Let the (normalized) probability of exploration be a function
∆ρ2 : X → [0, 1/α] such that
´
X
∆ρ2 = 1. The corresponding timing game is a game in
which player 1 plays a distributional strategy, player 2 plays a normalized strategy subject to
the terminal condition ρ2(1, ·) = ∆ρ2(·), and the payoff function is given by Equation (2.3).
Denote ∆ρ1 := 1. For any timing game, define ∆ρmin := min{∆ρ1,∆ρ2} and t∗ :=´
X
∆ρmindx > 0.
Definition 6 (Leveling strategy in timing game). The leveling function in a timing game








1{f(x)∆ρmin(x)≥ḡ(t)}(x)dx = t for all t ∈ [0, t∗].







1{f(x)∆ρmin(x)≥ḡ(t)}(x) for all t ∈ [0, t∗] and x ∈ X.
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The proof of the existence, uniqueness, and absolute continuity of the leveling function
in a timing game is analogous to that of Lemma 1. So we omit it here. With abuse
of notation, a strategy ρ, normalized or otherwise, in the timing game is called a lev-
eling strategy if ρ|[0,t∗]×X = ρ̄. It is obvious that a leveling strategy exists. Since the
characterization only applies to t ∈ [0, t∗], it is unique only when t∗ = 1 or equivalently
∆ρ2 = 1. In that case, the leveling strategy coincides with the benchmark one. We de-
note posterior distribution as gi(t, x) := f(x) (∆ρmin(x)− ρi(t, x)), and the upper contour
set H(t) := {x ∈ X : f(x)∆ρmin(x) ≥ ḡ(t)}. Note that the definitions agree with the
benchmark case in which the probability of exploration is one, i.e., ∆ρ2 = 1.
Theorem 3 is shown by two further results. The key idea is that any strategy of player 2
can be decomposed to the probability of exploration and its corresponding timing of explo-
ration. For fixed probability of exploration, Lemma 5 characterizes the set of Nash equilib-
rium in the timing game as the set of leveling strategy profiles. Its proof is analogous to that
of Theorem 2. Lemma 6 concludes that the symmetric leveling profile in the benchmark case
is the unique Nash equilibrium in the normalized game. Over all probabilities of exploration,
∆ρmin = 1 uniquely achieves the highest minimum payoff for player 2.
Lemma 5. For any ∆ρ2, the profile (ρ1, ρ2) is a Nash equilibrium in the timing game if and
only if it is a leveling strategy profile.
Proof. The proof is similar to that for Theorem 2. We hereby comment on the three instances
in which it requires modifications.























The integrand in the second term motivates the more general definition of the posterior
distribution. The myopic argument is applied to t ∈ [0, t∗] during which the maximum
posterior is ḡ(t) attained onH(t), and then to t ∈ (t∗, 1] during which the maximum posterior
0 is attained on {x ∈ X : ∆ρmin = 0}.































In the benchmark case, the three lemmas and the two corollaries apply to T ×X; in the
timing game, they carry through with restriction to [0, t∗]×X.
For the result analogous to Lemma 4, the function g̃i is defined more generally as
supx∈H(t) gi(t, x) − gi(t∗, x), because g2(t∗, ·) may not zero in the timing game. As in the
benchmark case, the boundary condition at t = t∗ implies that the constant of integration
is zero C = 0. On H(t∗) = {x ∈ X : ∆ρmin(x) > 0} almost surely, the other boundary
condition at t = ḡ−1 (f(x)∆ρmin(x)) < t∗ shows that
gi(t∗, x) = lim
s↓t
gi(s, x)− ḡ(t, x) = f(x)∆ρmin(x)− f(x)∆ρmin(x) = 0.
This establishes the desired result.
Lemma 6. Let ρ̄ be the leveling strategy in the benchmark case. In the normalized game,
the symmetric leveling profile (ρ̄, ρ̄) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We first argue that the candidate is a Nash equilibrium in the normalized game.
Recall that the leveling strategy in the benchmark case is the unique leveling strategy in the
timing game with ∆ρ2 = 1. Player 1 has the same set of strategies in both the timing game
with ∆ρ2 = 1 and the normalized game. Since the profile is a Nash equilibrium in the former
game, he has no profitable deviation in the latter. Player 2 has no profitable deviations by
the myopic argument because of the leveling posterior g1.
We now show the uniqueness. Any equilibrium of the normalized game is an equilibrium
of the timing game with the corresponding normalized probability of exploration, since the
strategy set in the former game is a superset of that in the latter. For each ∆ρ2, Lemma 5
characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of the timing game as the set of leveling profiles, with




is uniquely maximized at ∆ρ2(x) = 1. Therefore, the equilibrium payoff π/2 can only be
achieved with ∆ρ2 = 1 almost everywhere with the corresponding strategy profile (ρ̄, ρ̄).
Let (ρ1, ρ2) be an equilibrium strategy profile of a timing game with ∆ρ2(·) 6≡ 1. The
player 2’s payoff of playing ρ̄2 is
u2(ρ̄, ρ1) ≥ u2(ρ̄, ρ̄) > u2(ρ2, ρ1).
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The weak inequality is because ρ̄ is a best response to itself for player 1. The strict inequality
is due to the fact that ∆ρ2(·) 6≡ 1. Therefore, ρ̄ is a profitable deviation for player 2 in the
normalized game.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. It suffices to show that Pβ(t) is increasing in β for all t ∈ T . By differentiating







The Lipschitz term due to the changing domain of integration vanishes because 1− ḡ(t)
f(x) = 0
on {x ∈ X : f(x) = ḡ(t)}.
As the leveling function ḡ is absolutely continuous, the probability of discovery is abso-
lutely continuous with respect to β with derivative
∂βPβ(t) = − tḡ′(βt)
ˆ
X





















β-almost everywhere, where the third equality follows from Equation (3.4).
A.6 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Verifying that the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium is analogous to the arguments
in Section 3.3.1 and we shall not replicate the proof here. In any symmetric strategy profile
and hence any symmetric Nash equilibrium, the payoff of each player is π/n by symmetry.
We first show that, for any strategy ρ, the leveling strategy ρ̄ guarantees player i payoff
π/n when all other players employ ρ. Since the leveling strategy is t-absolutely continuous,
40
the payoff of player i equals to the time integral of flow payoffs by Fubini’s theorem











f(x)(1− ρ−i(t, x))∂tρ̄(t, x)dxdt .
As the leveling profile gives payoff π/n for all players, it suffices to show that, for all t ∈ (0, 1),





f(x)(1− ρ(t, x))n−1∂tρ̄(t, x)dx (A.8)
subject to the capacity constraint at t. Without the constraint ρ(t, ·) ≤ 1, the relaxed
problem must is equivalent to the first-order condition
(n− 1)f(x)∂tρ̄(t, x)(1− ρ(t, x))n−2 = C
for {x ∈ X : ρ(t, x) > 0} almost everywhere, together with the complementary slackness
condition
(n− 1)f(x)∂tρ̄(t, x) ≤ C
for {x ∈ X : ρ(t, x) = 0} almost everywhere, for some Lagrange multiplier C ≥ 0. It is then
straightforward to show that the leveling strategy ρ(t, ·) solves the two conditions and hence
the minimization problem.
From here, uniqueness can be shown along the idea of Theorem 2 by constructing a
modified leveling strategy that yields strictly higher payoff, as in the case of n = 2. We
provide here a shorter proof that takes advantage of the strict convexity of minimization
problem (A.8) when n > 2. With duplication among other players, they can no longer
achieve the minimum payoff of player i by any other strategies.
We proceed to show that the leveling strategy ρ̄ yields payoff strictly above π/n when
all other players employ ρ 6= ρ̄. Since the strategy is not leveling, there exist time interval
(t0, t1) and positive-measure set A ⊂ X such that ρ(t, x) 6= ρ̄(t, x) for all t ∈ (t0, t1) and
x ∈ A. The strict convexity of minimization problem (A.8) implies that the minimizer ρ̄(t, ·)
is unique. Therefore, the flow payoff of ρ̄ is strictly above the minimum over (t0, t1).
For any symmetric strategy profile (ρ, ..., ρ) for ρ 6= ρ̄, all players have a profitable
deviation to ρ̄. Therefore, the strategy profile is not an equilibrium.
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A.7 Proof of Theorem 7
We first show a technical lemma.
Lemma 7. Let v1 and v2 be continuous, strictly decreasing, and convex functions from




0 v2(s)ds. Denote v
−1
1 and v−12
as their respective inverses, with the extension of value 0 outside of their domains. Then´ t
0 v1(s)ds ≥
´ t








2 (y)dy for all
z ∈ R+.













2 (y)dy for all z ∈ R+. The converse is analogous.
Since vm,m ∈ {1, 2}, is strictly decreasing and convex, it has a strictly negative derivative

















Equation (A.9) and Equation (A.10) combines to give,
ˆ t
0







Thus the desired inequality holds on the set S := {t ∈ T : v1(t) = v2(t)} because it follows






(v−12 (y)− v−11 (y))dy ≤ 0.
The set S is closed by the continuity of v1 and v2, and it contains t = 1 by assumption. The
inequality holds trivially at t = 0. Denote S∗ := S ∪ {0}.
For any t /∈ S∗, define two endpoints t := max{s ∈ S∗ : s < t} and t̄ := min{s ∈ S∗ : s >
t}. They are well-defined because S∗ is closed. The difference v1(s) − v2(s) has the same
sign over (t, t̄) by continuity, so its integral
´ t′
0 (v1(s)− v2(s))ds is monotonic over the same
interval. As the desired inequality holds at the endpoints, it actually holds over the entire
interval, and at t in particular.
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Proof of Theorem 7. Suppose n′ > n. Let ḡ′ and ḡ be the leveling function associated with
n′ players and n players respectively. Parallel to the proof of the benchmark case, the
probabilities of simultaneous discovery are both zero, and the flow probabilities of discovery
are n′ḡ′ and nḡ respectively. By Lemma 7, it suffices to prove the stochastic order between
their inverses h′(·/n′) and h(·/n).
































where the integrand is given by








n−1 y, if n ≥ y
f(x) ;
f(x), if n < y
f(x) .
We obtain the desired inequality by noting that I(n, y, f(x)) is decreasing in n.
A.8 Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. Let ḡm be the equilibrium leveling functions for prior fm, and its inverse is hm,









As the probability of simultaneous discovery is zero, the flow probabilities of discovery are




0 nḡ2(s)ds for all t ∈ Y.
Since ḡ1 and ḡ2 satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 7, it suffices to show their inverses satisfy´ z
0 h1(y)dy ≤
´ z
0 h2(y)dy ∀z ∈ R+. By Equation (A.12), the Fubini theorem, and then a









































I(w, z)dλ ◦ f−1m









n−1 z, if w ≥ z;
w
n
, if w < z.
The result follows because I(·, z) is an increasing concave function and λ ◦ f−11 is a mean-
preserving spread of λ ◦ f−12 .
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